Correlation Properties of the Bluetooth Combiner

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Abstract. In its intended usage the lengths of the key stream sequences produced by the Bluetooth stream cipher $E_0$ are strictly limited. In this paper the importance of this limitation is proved by showing that the Bluetooth stream cipher with 128 bit key can be broken in $O(2^{64})$ steps given an output key stream segment of length $O(2^{64})$. We also show how the correlation properties of the $E_0$ combiner can be improved by making a small modification in the memory update function.

1 Introduction

Bluetooth™ is a standard for wireless connectivity specified by the Bluetooth™ Special Interest Group in [1]. The specification defines a stream cipher algorithm $E_0$ to be used for point-to-point encryption between the elements of a Bluetooth network. The structure of $E_0$ is a modification of a summation bit generator with memory. In this paper we call it the Bluetooth combiner and analyze its correlation properties. A few correlation theorems originating from [4] are stated and exploited in the analysis. Also a new kind of divide-and-conquer attack is introduced, which shows the importance of limiting the lengths of produced key stream sequences.

As a consequence of these results, we propose a modification to the Bluetooth combiner. This modification could be done at no extra cost, that is, it does not increase the complexity of the algorithm. But, on the other hand, it would improve the correlation properties of the Bluetooth combiner to some extent. However, as long as no practical attack is known against the current version of the Bluetooth combiner, the results given in this paper remain theoretical.

2 Correlation Theorems

2.1 Definitions and Notation

Let us introduce the notation to be used throughout this paper. We shall consider the field $GF(2^n)$ as a linear space with a given fixed basis, and denote by $x_t$ an n-dimensional vector in $GF(2^n)$ as $x_t = (x_{t1}, x_{t2}, \ldots, x_{tn})$. The inner product $\cdot$ between two vectors $w = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n)$ and $x = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n)$ of the space $GF(2^n)$ is defined as

$$w : x = w_1 x_1 \oplus w_2 x_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus w_n x_n.$$
The linear function \( L_u(x) \) is then
\[
L_u(x) = u \cdot x, \quad u, x \in GF(2^n).
\]
We use the same definition of correlation between two Boolean functions as in [3], where it is also referred to as “normalized correlation”.

**Definition 1.** Let \( f, g : GF(2^n) \to GF(2) \) be Boolean functions. The correlation between \( f \) and \( g \) is
\[
c(f, g) = 2^{-n}(|\{ x \in GF(2^n) | f(x) = g(x) \}| - |\{ x \in GF(2^n) | f(x) \neq g(x) \}|).
\]
Sometimes the notation \( c_x(f(x), g(x)) \) is used to emphasize the variable with respect to which the correlation is to be calculated.

Finally, we recall Parseval’s theorem, which implies, in particular, that any Boolean function is correlated to some linear functions.

**Theorem 2.** (Parseval’s Theorem)
\[
\sum_{w \in GF(2^n)} c(f, L_w)^2 = 1.
\]

### 2.2 Correlation Theorems

Iterated structures and combinations of transformations with common input are frequently seen building blocks of cryptographic algorithms. The following correlation theorems are useful in the analysis of propagation of correlations over such structures. The proofs of the theorems can be found in [4].

**Theorem 3.** Given functions \( f : GF(2^n) \times GF(2^k) \to GF(2) \) and \( g : GF(2^m) \to GF(2^k) \) we set
\[
h(x, y) = f(x, g(y)), \quad x \in GF(2^n), \quad y \in GF(2^m).
\]
Then, for all \( u \in GF(2^n), v \in GF(2^m), \)
\[
c_{x,y}(h(x, y), u \cdot x \oplus v \cdot y) = \sum_{w \in GF(2^{k+1})} c_{x,z}(f(x, z), u \cdot x \oplus w \cdot z)c_y(w \cdot g(y), v \cdot y).
\]

We note that Theorem 3 can be considered as a generalization of Lemma 2 of [3]. In the second correlation theorem a Boolean function, which is a sum of two functions with partially common input, is considered.

**Theorem 4.** Let \( f : GF(2^n) \times GF(2^k) \to GF(2) \) and \( g : GF(2^k) \times GF(2^m) \to GF(2) \) be Boolean functions. Then, for all \( u \in GF(2^n), w \in GF(2^m), \)
\[
c_{x,y,z}(f(x, y) \oplus g(y, z), u \cdot x \oplus w \cdot z)
= \sum_{v \in GF(2^m)} c_{x,y}(f(x, y), u \cdot x \oplus v \cdot y)c_{y,z}(g(y, z), v \cdot y \oplus w \cdot z).
\]
If here the two functions $f$ and $g$, and the two linear combinations $u$ and $w$ are the same, we have the following corollary.

**Corollary 5.** Let $f : GF(2^n) \times GF(2^k) \rightarrow GF(2)$ be a Boolean function. Then, for all $u \in GF(2^n)$,

$$c_{x,y,\xi} (f(x,y) \oplus f(\xi, y), u \cdot (x \oplus \xi)) = \sum_{v \in GF(2^n)} c_{x,y} (f(x,y), u \cdot x \oplus v \cdot y)^2.$$

### 3 Combination Generators

In [3] an example of a summation bit generator with one bit of memory is introduced and analyzed. The combiner of the Bluetooth key stream generator can be considered as a variation of the thoroughly analyzed basic summation bit generator, see [3] and [2]. A general class of combination generators with memory giving the generators of [3] and [1] as special cases is defined as follows:

$$z_t = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} x_t^i \oplus c_t^0 \quad (1)$$

$$c_t = f(c_{t-1}, c_{t-1}, \ldots, c_{t-d}) \quad (2)$$

Here $x_t = (x_t^1, \ldots, x_t^n) \in GF(2^n)$ is the fresh input to the combiner at time $t$ and $c_t^i \in GF(2)$ is the one-bit input from the memory, $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$. The fresh input is formed by $n$ independent sequences $x^i = (x_t^i, x_t^i, \ldots)$, $i = 1, 2, \ldots, n$, which are typically generated by $n$ linear feedback shift registers.

The memory constitutes of $md$ bits arranged as a register of $d$ consecutive cells of $m$ bits each. The memory is updated by computing a new $m$-bit $c_t = (c_t^0, \ldots, c_t^m)$ using a function $f$ from the fresh input and from the contents of the memory saving the new $c_t$ in the memory and discarding $c_{t-d}$. The output bit $z_t$ is computed as an xor-sum of the fresh input $x_t$ and the previously computed update $c_t$ of the memory.

Correlation attacks aimed at recovering the keys, which determine the generation of the fresh input, are based on correlations between a number of fresh input bits and the output bits. For the type of generators defined by (1) such correlations relations can be derived from correlations between consecutive “carry” bits $c_t^i$.

Such correlations are usually found by exhaustive search. This is the case also with the Bluetooth combiner which is such a relatively small system that this kind of “trial and error”-search is possible. In larger systems, however, some more sophisticated means for finding these correlation equations should be used. One such method is presented in [2].

### 4 Bluetooth Combiner

Bluetooth chips are small components capable of short range communication with each other. The Bluetooth specification is given in [1]. In the security part
of [1] an encryption algorithm $E_0$ is specified to be used for protection of the confidentiality of the Bluetooth communication.

The algorithm $E_0$ is of the form specified by (1) and (2). It consists of four LFSRs of length 128 in total, a non-linear memory update function $f_i$ which is a composition of a nonlinear $f_i$ and a linear mapping $T$.

The functions define the following recursive equations. The output key sequence $z_t$, used to encipher the plaintext, is

$$z_t = x_t^1 \oplus x_t^2 \oplus x_t^3 \oplus x_t^4 \oplus c_t^0,$$

where $(x_t^1, x_t^2, x_t^3, x_t^4)$ is the fresh input at time $t$ produced by the four LFSRs. Non-linearity is represented in the sequence $s_t$, defined by the following formula, where “+” means the ordinary integer sum:

$$s_{t+1} = (s_{t+1}^1, s_{t+1}^0) = f_1(x_t, c_t) = \left\lceil \frac{x_t^1 + x_t^2 + x_t^3 + x_t^4 + 2c_t^1 + c_t^0}{2} \right\rceil.$$

The function $f_1$ introduces the necessary non-linearity in the system, as integer summation is non-linear in $GF(2)$. The memory bits $c_t$ are then defined with the aid of $s_t$ as

$$c_{t+1} = (c_{t+1}^1, c_{t+1}^0) = T(s_{t+1}, c_t, c_{t-1}) = T_0(s_{t+1}) \oplus T_1(c_t) \oplus T_2(c_{t-1}).$$

Here $T_0, T_1$ and $T_2$ are linear transformations. Although non-linearity is crucial for security, the choice of the linear mapping $T$ has also certain influence to the security of the $E_0$ algorithm, as we will see later.

### 4.1 The Mapping $T$

The linear mapping $T$ of $E_0$ mix the old bits from the memory to the new updated memory bits. The main focus of this work is to investigating its role in the correlation properties. For the given $f_1$ we see (c.f. Table 1) that $c(s_t^0, c_{t-1}^0 \oplus u \cdot x_t) = 0$, for all $u \in GF(2)$. Hence these are not useful in correlation attacks. On the other hand, $c(s_t^1, c_{t-1}^1 \oplus u^0 c_{t-1}^0 \oplus u \cdot x_t^0) \neq 0$, $i = 0, 1$.

The mapping $T$ consists of three mappings, $T_0, T_1$ and $T_2$, as

$$c_{t+1} = T(s_{t+1}, c_t, c_{t-1})$$

$$= T_0(s_{t+1}) \oplus T_1(c_t) \oplus T_2(c_{t-1}).$$

In matrix form, $T_0 = T_1 = I$, where $I$ is a $2 \times 2$ identity matrix. Further,

$$T_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

This means, the bits of $c_t = (c_t^1, c_t^0)$ are

$$c_t^1 = s_t^1 \oplus c_{t-1}^1 \oplus c_{t-2}^0$$

$$c_t^0 = s_t^0 \oplus c_{t-1}^0 \oplus c_{t-2}^1 \oplus c_{t-2}^0.$$  \hfill (3)

With different choices of $T_0, T_1$ and $T_2$ the correlation properties of the system become different. This shall be analyzed in section 5.
4.2 Correlation Analysis of the Bluetooth Combiner

The memory in Bluetooth has four bits, two bits for each two consecutive time steps \( t \) and \( t-1 \). The function, which is used to form a new term \( x_t \) of the keys stream, is linear. The non-linearity is gained from the function \( f_1 \), which is used to calculate \( s_t \). As argued in [3], and in more general terms in [2], there remain always some correlations in such a system. They shall be analyzed next.

The analysis exploits the correlations of the form

\[
c(w \cdot s_{t+1}, u \cdot x_t \oplus v \cdot c_t)
\]

where \( u \in GF(2^4) \) and \( v = (v^1, v^0) \in GF(2^2) \). Different choices of \( u \) and \( v \) correspond to different linear combinations of \( x^1_t, x^2_t, x^3_t, c^0_t \) and \( c^1_t \). In the following Table 1 all the correlations are presented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( v^1 )</th>
<th>( v^0 )</th>
<th>weight of ( u )</th>
<th>( s^1_{t+1} )</th>
<th>( s^0_{t+1} )</th>
<th>( s^1_{t+1} \oplus s^0_{t+1} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1
| 1 | 0 | \( \frac{1}{2} \) | 0 | -1
| 2 | 0 | 0 | \( \frac{1}{4} \) | 0
| 3 | 0 | -\( \frac{1}{8} \) | -\( \frac{1}{2} \) | 0
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
| 0 | 1 | \( \frac{1}{2} \) | 0 | 0
| 1 | 0 | 0 | -\( \frac{1}{2} \) | 0
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
| 3 | 0 | -\( \frac{1}{8} \) | -\( \frac{1}{4} \) | 0
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | -\( \frac{1}{2} \)
| 1 | -\( \frac{1}{2} \) | 0 | | 0
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
| 3 | \( \frac{1}{8} \) | -\( \frac{1}{4} \) | 0 | 0
| 4 | 0 | 0 | -\( \frac{1}{4} \) | 0

Table 1. The correlations for \( s^1_{t+1}, s^0_{t+1} \) and \( s^1_{t+1} \oplus s^0_{t+1} \).

We note that, since the system is symmetric with respect to each \( x^j_t \), only the Hamming weight of \( u \) is of importance. We also see that for \( s^0_{t+1} \), the correlation is zero, if \( v_1 = 0 \). Next we present derivation of the strongest correlation relation we found within the Bluetooth combiner.
Add $c_{i-3}^0$ to the both sides of (4) and rearrange the terms to get
\[ c_i^0 \oplus c_{i-1}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0 = s_i^0 \oplus c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0. \]  
(5)

Next we use Theorem 3 to get
\[
c(c_i^0 \oplus c_{i-1}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0, 0) = c(s_i^0, c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0) = \sum_{w \in GF(2^2)} c(s_i^0, w \cdot c_{i-1}) \chi(w \cdot c_{i-1}, c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0),
\]
with $u = 0$, $v = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0)$ and $y = (s_{i-1}^0, s_{i-1}^0, c_{i-2}^0, c_{i-2}^0, c_{i-3}^0, c_{i-3}^0)$. Now from Table 1 we know, that the terms of the sum are zero for $w = (0, 1), w = (1, 1)$ and $w = (0, 0)$. Only the term with $w = (1, 0)$ remains. So, the correlation equation is simplified to
\[
c(c_i^0 \oplus c_{i-1}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0, 0) = c(s_i^0, c_{i-1}) \chi(c_{i-1}, c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0)
\]
\[
= c(s_i^0, c_{i-1}) \chi(s_{i-1}, c_{i-2}^0).
\]

Here the last equation is obtained by moving back in time for one step in equation (3), so that
\[ c_{i-1}^1 = c_{i-1}^1 \oplus s_{i-1}^1 \oplus c_{i-3}^0. \]

Using the values of Table 1, we finally get
\[
c(c_i^0 \oplus c_{i-1}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0, 0) = -1 = \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{16}.
\]  
(6)

After this we notice that
\[ z_i \oplus z_{i-1} \oplus z_{i-3} = \bigoplus_{i=1}^4 x_i^i \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^4 x_{i-1}^i \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^4 x_{i-3}^i \oplus c_i^0 \oplus c_{i-1}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0. \]

We conclude by equation (6) that
\[
c(z_i \oplus z_{i-1} \oplus z_{i-3}, \bigoplus_{i=1}^4 x_i^i \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^4 x_{i-1}^i \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^4 x_{i-3}^i) = -\frac{1}{16}.
\]  
(7)

Since the output function of the Bluetooth combiner is XOR, it is maximum order correlation immune. Hence divide and conquer attacks in their standard form are not useful for determining the initial states of the LFSR’s. In section 6 it is shown how the achieved correlation relation can be utilized to determine a theoretical upper-bound of the level of the security of the Bluetooth combiner.
5 Alternative Mappings for Mixing the Carry Bits

The goal of this section is to investigate how the choice of the mapping $T$ affects the correlation properties of the Bluetooth combiner. In particular, we show that the mapping $T$ can be selected in such a way that more than two linear approximations are needed when establishing a correlation relation between consecutive carry bits.

Our method exploits a matrix which makes it possible to consider all possible linear approximations of the function $f_1$ simultaneously.

Let $T_0, T_1$ and $T_2$ be arbitrary $2 \times 2$ matrices:

$$T_0 = \begin{pmatrix} t_{01}^1 & t_{01}^2 \\ t_{02}^3 & t_{02}^4 \end{pmatrix}, \quad T_1 = \begin{pmatrix} t_{11}^1 & t_{11}^2 \\ t_{12}^3 & t_{12}^4 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \text{and} \quad T_2 = \begin{pmatrix} t_{21}^1 & t_{21}^2 \\ t_{22}^3 & t_{22}^4 \end{pmatrix}.$$  

Then

$$c_t = T_0s_t \oplus T_1c_{t-1} \oplus T_2c_{t-2}. \quad \text{(8)}$$

We write $T_1 = A \oplus B$. Here the analyst can choose $A$ and $B$ in which way ever is convenient, as long as their sum is $T_1$. The equation (8) can be written as

$$c_t = T_0s_t \oplus Ac_{t-1} \oplus Bc_{t-1} \oplus T_2c_{t-2}. \quad \text{(9)}$$

We perform one iteration by inserting equation (8), applied for $t - 1$ instead of $t$, to the equation (9) and get

$$c_t = T_0s_t \oplus Bc_{t-1} \oplus AT_0s_{t-1} \oplus AT_1c_{t-2} \oplus AT_2c_{t-3} \oplus T_2c_{t-2}. \quad \text{(10)}$$

Now, $A$ may be chosen. Let $D$ be a matrix of the form

$$D = \begin{pmatrix} d_1 & d_2 \\ 0 & d_4 \end{pmatrix}.$$  

As the analyst wishes to minimize the number of correlation approximations, she wants $c_t^0$ not to depend on $c_{t-2}$. Therefore, she chooses $AT_2 = D$. If we assume that $T_2$ is invertible then such a choice is always possible. Inserting $B = T_1 \oplus A$ into equation (10), as well as $A = DT_2^{-1}$, we have

$$c_t = T_0s_t \oplus (T_1 \oplus DT_2^{-1})c_{t-1} \oplus (DT_2^{-1}T_0)s_{t-1} \oplus (DT_2^{-1}T_1 \oplus T_2)c_{t-2} \oplus DC_{t-3}. \quad \text{(11)}$$

In order to take the correlation approximations into consideration, we write them in matrix form as

$$s_t = X_tc_{t-1},$$

where

$$X_t = \begin{pmatrix} e_t^1 & e_t^2 \\ e_t^3 & e_t^4 \end{pmatrix},$$

and $s_t$ and $c_{t-1}$ are taken as vertical vectors.
We see from Table 1, that if $c_{t}^{3} = 0$ the correlations for $s_{t}^{0}$
\[ c(s_{t}^{0}, c_{t-1}^{3} \cdot c_{t-1}^{4} \cdot c_{t-1}^{u} \cdot x_{t}) , \]
are always zero. Therefore we can presume $c_{t}^{3} = 1$. The choice of $u$ does not affect the best non-zero values of the correlations. Therefore, we shall drop $u \cdot x_{t}$ and merely study the combinations of $s_{t+1}^{0}$ and $c_{t}^{1}$.

We approximate twice by inserting $s_{t} = X_{t}c_{t-1}$ into equation (11), which yields
\[ c_{t} = (T_{0}X_{t} \oplus T_{1} \oplus DT_{2}^{-1})c_{t-1} \oplus |DT_{2}^{-1}T_{0}X_{t-1} \oplus DT_{2}^{-1}T_{1} \oplus DT_{2}^{-1}c_{t-2} \oplus DC_{t-3}. (12) \]
In Bluetooth the generated key-sequence $z_{t}$ does not depend on $c_{t}^{1}$ but merely on $c_{t}^{0}$. Hence, similarly as above in section 4.2, we aim at establishing a correlation relation between zero components of $c_{t}$.

**Theorem 6.** Let in the Bluetooth combiner generator $T_{0} = T_{1} = I$ and $T_{2}$ an arbitrary invertible $2 \times 2$ matrix. If $t_{2}^{3} = 1$, then two correlation approximations suffices to establish a correlation between the input and output.

**Proof.** Substitute $T_{0} = T_{1} = I$ and the general form of $T_{2}$ into (12) and obtain the following correlation relation for $c_{t}^{0}$:
\[ c_{t}^{0} = (1 \oplus d_{4}, c_{t-1} \oplus 1 \oplus d_{4}t_{2}) \cdot c_{t-1} \]
\[ \oplus (d_{4}c_{t-1}^{1} \oplus d_{4}t_{2}^{1} \oplus d_{4} \oplus 1, d_{4}c_{t-1}^{2} \oplus d_{4}t_{2}^{2} \oplus d_{4}^{2} \oplus d_{4}t_{2}^{3} \oplus t_{2}^{3}) \cdot c_{t-2} \]
\[ \oplus d_{4}c_{t-3}^{0} \]
To have only two approximations means that there must be neither $c_{t-1}^{1}$ nor $c_{t-2}^{1}$ in the equation above, i.e.
\[ 1 \oplus d_{4} = 0 \quad (13) \]
and
\[ d_{4}c_{t-1}^{1} \oplus d_{4}t_{2}^{1} \oplus d_{4} \oplus 1 = 0. \quad (14) \]
If $d_{4} = 0$, then the other approximation will cancel out, so that equation (11) transforms into the initial equation
\[ c_{t}^{0} = s_{t}^{0} \oplus c_{t-1}^{0} \oplus c_{t-2}^{1} \oplus c_{t-2}^{0}. \]
As this is not what the analyst wants, she chooses $d_{4} = 1$ and equation (13) is true. From (14) we then get that
\[ e_{t-1}^{1} \oplus t_{2}^{1} = 0. \]
Now we check from Table 1 that $c(s_{t-1}^{i}c_{t-2}^{0} \oplus u \cdot x_{t-2}) \neq 0$ for some $u$. Hence it is possible to use this correlation if $t_{2}^{1} = 0$. Similarly, if $t_{2}^{2} = 1$, we see that $e_{t-1}^{1} = 1$ is possible, as $c(s_{t-1}^{i}c_{t-2}^{0} \oplus v^{0} \cdot c_{t-2}^{0} \oplus u \cdot x_{t-2}) \neq 0$ for some choice of $u$ and $v^{0}$. \[ \square \]
In the case of the initial choice of Bluetooth $T_2$, we have $t_2^3 = 1$. So, as we saw earlier in section 4.2, only two iteration approximations are needed. The approximation matrices $X_t$ in the case of (6) were

$$X_{t-1} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

$$X_t = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

From Table 1 we see that $c(s_{t-1}^1, c_{t-2}^1) = \frac{5}{8}$. Hence

$$T_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

with $t_1^1 = 1$ would have been still a weaker choice than the current $T_2$ in Bluetooth. Next we show that a stronger choice would have been possible.

**Theorem 7.** Let $t_2^3 = 0$. Then at least three approximation rounds are needed.

**Proof.** If $t_2^3 = 0$, and $T_2$ is invertible as assumed, then $t_1^1 = t_2^4 = 1$. Also $T_2^{-1} = T_2$. Let

$$D = \begin{pmatrix} d_1 & d_2 \\ d_3 & d_4 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Then, as in (12) we have

$$c_t = (X_t \oplus I \oplus DT_2)c_{t-1} \oplus (DT_2X_{t-1} \oplus DT_2X_{t-1} \oplus DT_2 \oplus DT_2 \oplus T_2)c_{t-2},$$

and further,

$$c_t^0 = (1 \oplus d_3, c_t^1 \oplus 1 \oplus t_2^3d_3 \oplus d_4) \cdot c_{t-1}$$

$$\oplus [d_3c_{t-1}^1 \oplus c_{t-1}^3 (t_2^3d_3 \oplus d_4) \oplus d_3,$n

$$d_3c_{t-1}^2 \oplus c_{t-1}^4 (t_2^3d_3 \oplus d_4) \oplus t_2^3d_3 \oplus d_4 \oplus 1] \cdot c_{t-2}$$

$$\oplus (d_3, d_4) \cdot c_{t-3}$$

Now, if $d_3 = 1$, then we have $c_{t-3}^1$ in the equation, so we need to do at least one more approximation, hence two approximations is not enough. If $d_3 = 0$, then $c_{t-1}^1$ is within the equation of $c_t^0$ and again more than two approximations are needed. \hfill \Box

An example of a matrix $T_2$, which requires at least three approximations to get correlation relations between the carry bits $c_t^0$ from different time instances, is $T_2 = I$. We consider, for example, the correlation between $c_t^0$ and $c_{t-4}^0$. The correlation relation could involve some $x_t$ variables at appropriate moments $t$, but in what follows we restrict to the case where the Hamming weight of $u$ is always zero.

Corresponding to the equations (3) and (4) we now have

$$c_t^1 = s_t^1 \oplus c_{t-1}^1 \oplus c_{t-2}^1,$$

$$c_t^0 = s_t^0 \oplus c_{t-1}^0 \oplus c_{t-2}^0.$$
Since no \( x_{t-1} \) is involved, we have by Theorem 3 and with the aid of Table 1
\[
c(t_{t-1}^0, c_{t-1}^0) = c(s_{t-1}^0, c_{t-1}^0 + c_{t-2}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
= \sum_w c(s_{t-1}^0, w \cdot c_{t-1})c(w \cdot c_{t-1}, c_{t-2}^0 + c_{t-2}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
= c(s_{t-1}^0, c_{t-1}^1)c(c_{t-1}^0, c_{t-1}^0 + c_{t-2}^0 + c_{t-4}^0).
\]
The second equality follows from Theorem 3, and in the third we noted that the only non-zero correlation for \( c(s_{t-1}^0, w \cdot c_{t-1}) \) is due to \( w = (1,0) \). We continue in the same manner to obtain:
\[
c(t_{t-1}^0, c_{t-1}^0)
\]
\[
= -\frac{1}{4} c(s_{t-1}^0, c_{t-1}^0 \circ c_{t-2}^0 + c_{t-3}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
= -\frac{1}{4} \sum_w c(s_{t-1}^0, s_{t-1}^0, w \cdot c_{t-2})c(w \cdot c_{t-2}, c_{t-2}^0 + c_{t-3}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
= -\frac{1}{4} (c(s_{t-1}^0, s_{t-1}^0, 0)c(c_{t-2}^0 + c_{t-3}^0 + c_{t-4}^0, 0)
\]
\[
+ c(s_{t-1}^0, s_{t-1}^0, c_{t-2} + c_{t-2}^0)c(c_{t-2}^0 + c_{t-3}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
\) (15)\]

From the two terms inside the brackets only the last one is non-zero. To see this
we calculate the first term
\[
c(c_{t-1}^3 \circ c_{t-3}^0 + c_{t-4}^0, 0)
\]
\[
= c(s_{t-2}^0, c_{t-3}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
= \sum_w c(s_{t-2}^0, w \cdot c_{t-3}^0)c(w \cdot c_{t-3}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
= c(s_{t-2}^0, c_{t-3}^0)c(c_{t-4}^0 + c_{t-4}^0, 0) + c(s_{t-2}^0, c_{t-3}^0)c(c_{t-3}^0, c_{t-4}^0 + c_{t-4}^0).
\]

In the last equality the first term in the sum is zero, since the memory bits on
the same moment are assumed to be statistically independent. We continue with
the second part of the sum:
\[
c(c_{t-1}^3 + c_{t-1}^0, c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
= c(s_{t-1}^0 + s_{t-1}^0, c_{t-4}^0 + c_{t-5}^0)
\]
\[
= \sum_w c(s_{t-1}^0 + s_{t-1}^0, w \cdot c_{t-1}^0)c(w \cdot c_{t-1}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
= \frac{5}{8} (c(s_{t-1}^0 + s_{t-1}^0, 0)c(c_{t-5}^0 + c_{t-5}^0, 0)
\]
\[
+ c(s_{t-1}^0 + s_{t-1}^0, c_{t-4}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)c(c_{t-4}^0 + c_{t-4}^0, c_{t-5}^0 + c_{t-5}^0)
\]
\[
= \frac{5}{8} \cdot \frac{1}{4} c(c_{t-4}^0 + c_{t-4}^0, c_{t-5}^0 + c_{t-5}^0).
\]

These calculations are easy to generalize to any moment \( t - j, j = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \), so
actually we have
\[
c(c_{t-1}^3 + c_{t-1}^0, c_{t-4}^0 + c_{t-4}^0)
\]
\[
\left( \frac{-5}{32} \right)^k c(c_{i-3}^1 \oplus c_{i-3}^0, c_{i-4}^1 \oplus c_{i-4}^0).
\]

Hence, infinitely many approximations should be done, and so the correlation can be regarded as zero:

\[
c(c_{i-3}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^1, c_{i-4}^0 \oplus c_{i-4}^1) = \lim_{k \to \infty} \left( \frac{-5}{32} \right)^k = 0.
\]

Let us now return to the equation 15. We have, that

\[
c(c_{i-2}^0, c_{i-3}^0) = -\frac{1}{4} c(c_{i-2}^0, c_{i-3}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^1 \oplus c_{i-4}^0)
\]

\[
= -\frac{1}{16} c(c_{i-2}^0, c_{i-3}^1) = -\frac{1}{64},
\]

which is significantly smaller than \(\frac{1}{10}\) in equation 6. In this manner, the correlation can be calculated for other weights of \(u\), too. The resulting values degenerate to a single product, as above, so that the product of the correlations is always significantly smaller than \(\frac{1}{10}\).

The Bluetooth combination generator is a strengthened version of the basic summation bit generator. By increasing the size of the memory the correlations have been reduced. We have shown that with the same memory size, by making a small modification in the memory update function, it would be possible to further reduce the correlations.

6 Ulti mate Divide and Conquer

In this section it is shown that divide and conquer attack becomes possible if the length of the given keystream is longer than the period \(p\) of the shortest (say, the first) LFSR used in the key stream generation. Assume that there is a relation with a non-zero correlation \(\rho\) between a linear combination of the shift register output bits

\[(u_1^1 x_1^1 \oplus \ldots \oplus u_n^1 x_1^n) \oplus \ldots \oplus (u_d^1 x_{d-1}^1 \oplus \ldots \oplus u_d^n x_{d-1}^n)\]

and the key stream bits

\[w_0 z_t \oplus w_1 z_{t-1} \oplus \ldots \oplus w_d z_{t-d},\]

over a number of \(d + 1\) time steps. Then it follows by Corollary 5 that we have a correlation relation between a linear combination of the keystream bits

\[w_0 (z_t \oplus z_{t+p}) \oplus w_1 (z_{t-1} \oplus z_{t+p-1}) \oplus \ldots \oplus w_d (z_{t-d} \oplus z_{t+p-d})\]

and a linear combination of the LFSR output bits

\[u_0^2 (x_t^2 \oplus x_{t+p}^2) \oplus \ldots \oplus u_0^n (x_t^n \oplus x_{t+p}^n) \oplus \ldots \]

\[\oplus u_d^2 (x_{d-1}^2 \oplus x_{d+p-1}^2) \oplus \ldots \oplus u_d^n (x_{d-1}^n \oplus x_{d+p-1}^n),\]
where the output bits from the first (the shortest) shift register cancel, since they are equal.

By Corollary 5, the strength of the correlation over the period \( p \) is at least \( p^2 \). Further, Corollary 5 shows how this lower bound can be improved. We state this result in a form of a theorem as follows.

**Theorem 8.** For a combination generator, assume that we have the following correlation

\[
c(u_0 z_t \oplus w_1 z_{t-1} \oplus \cdots \oplus w_d z_{t-d},
   (u_0^1 x_{t}^1 \oplus \cdots \oplus u_0^n x_{t}^1) \oplus \cdots \oplus (u_d^1 x_{t-d}^1 \oplus \cdots \oplus u_d^n x_{t-d}^1)) = \rho \neq 0.
\]

Let the lengths of the registers be \( L_1, \ldots, L_n \) and the periods \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \). Then given a keystream of length \( p_1 p_2 \cdots p_k + \frac{1}{d} + d \) one can do exhaustive search over the \( L_{k+1} + \cdots + L_n \) bits which form the initial contents of \( n - k \) registers.

If the LFSR registers have primitive feedback polynomials, then \( p_i = 2^{L_i} - 1 \).

In most applications \( n \) is even and the lengths \( L_i \) are about the same. Then given a sufficiently strong correlation between the input bits and the output bits of a combination generator, the complexity to determine the complete initial state of length \( L \) is about \( O(2^{L/2}) \). In other words, by generating key stream of length \( O(2^{L/2}) \) one can successfully carry out exhaustive search over \( L/2 \) bits of the initial state.

### 6.1 Periodic Correlations in Bluetooth

Computation of the correlations for the Bluetooth \( E_0 \) combiner is somewhat complicated due to multiple iteration. We make use of the relation \( c_{i+1}^0 + c_{i-1}^0 + c_{i-3}^0 = 0 \), see (6). Applying Theorem 3 we get

\[
c(c_i^0 \oplus c_{i-1}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0 \oplus c_{i+p} \oplus c_{i+p-1} \oplus c_{i+p-3}, 0) = c(s_i^0 \oplus s_{i+p}^0, c_{i-2}^0 \oplus c_{i-2}^1 \oplus c_{i+p-2}^0 \oplus c_{i+p-2}^1 + c_{i+p-3}^0)
\]

\[
= \sum_{w, w' \in G F(2^d)} c(s_i^0 \oplus s_{i+p}^0, w \cdot c_{i-1} + w' \cdot c_{i+p-1}) \cdot c(w \cdot c_{i-1} \oplus w' \cdot c_{i+p-1}^0 \oplus c_{i+p-2} \oplus c_{i+p-2}^0 \oplus c_{i+p-2}^1 \oplus c_{i+p-3}^0).
\]

Now we apply Theorem 4 to the first correlation in the product and get

\[
c(s_i^0 \oplus s_{i+p}^0, w \cdot c_{i-1} \oplus w' \cdot c_{i+p-1})
\]

\[
= \sum_{w \in G F(2^d)} c(s_i^0, w \cdot c_{i-1} \oplus u \cdot x) c(s_i^0, w' \cdot c_{i-1} \oplus u \cdot x).
\]

Here \( x \) has one, two, or three coordinates, depending on whether \( p \) is the least common period of one, two, or three LFSRs, respectively.

Let us now consider the case where \( p \) is the least common period of two LFSRs. From Table 1 we see that these correlations are nonzero if and only if
\(u = (0, 0)\) and \(w = w' = (1, 0)\), or \(u = (1, 1)\) and \(w = w' = (1, 0)\), or \(u = (0, 1)\) and \(w = w' = (1, 1)\).

The value \(w = w' = (1, 1)\) leads to a longer correlation relation extending over at least two rounds, and hence are expected be of less in amount, but still non-negative. Therefore, we discard the corresponding terms, and get a lower bound to the correlation from the remaining terms with \(w = w' = (1, 0)\) as follows

\[
\begin{align*}
c(c_i^0 \oplus c_{i-1}^0 \oplus c_{i-3}^0 \oplus c_{i+p}^0 \oplus c_{i+p-1}^0 \oplus c_{i+p-3}^0, 0) \\
\geq c(s_i^0, c_{i-1}^1 \oplus x_i^1 \oplus x_i^2)^2 \\
\cdot c(c_{i-1}^1 \oplus c_{i+p-1}^1, c_{i-2}^1 \oplus c_{i-3}^1 \oplus c_{i+p-2}^1 \oplus c_{i+p-3}^1) \\
= c(s_i^0, c_{i-1}^1)^2 + c(s_i^0, c_{i-1}^1 \oplus x_i^1 \oplus x_i^2)^2) \cdot \sum_{u \in GF(2^p)} c(s_i^0, c_{i-1}^1 \oplus u \cdot x_i^2)^2 \\
= ((-1/4)^2 + (1/4)^2)(1/4)^2 = 2^{-7},
\end{align*}
\]

using the correlation values given in Table 1.

It should be stressed, however, that the presented ultimate divide and conquer attack is of theoretical nature, and practical only if the analyzer is given access to key stream extending over periods of partial input. For example, the Bluetooth \(E_0\) algorithm in its intended use generates only short segments of keystream to encrypt each plaintext frame starting from a new independent initial state.

7 Conclusions

We have seen how the correlations in the Bluetooth combiner could be reduced by making a small modification in its memory update function. This improvement is, however, rather theoretical in nature, but quite interesting as such. The methods used in finding this modification are specific to Bluetooth, but could be easily adapted to other similar combiner generators. The technique involves a matrix describing potential approximations based on known non-zero linear correlations over the non-linear part of the memory update function.

We also showed how any significant correlations over a combiner can be used to launch a divide and conquer attack against any combiner generator provided that sufficient amount of the output keystream is given. If the input to the combiner is produced using a certain number of LFSRs with primitive feedback polynomials, and the number of bits of the total initial state is \(L\), then the complexity of this attack is upper bounded by \(O(2^{L/2})\). This will require the amount of same magnitude \(O(2^{L/2})\) of the output bits.

We conclude that if the effective key length of a combiner generator is required to be about the same magnitude as the size of the initial state, then the usage of the generator must be restricted in such a way that the length of any keystream block ever produced by this generator never exceeds the shortest period of the input sequences.
References

4. K. Nyberg Correlation theorems in cryptanalysis (submitted)

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